2
a great deal of friction between the First (Manchu) Division and the Third (Chinese) Division at Pao-Ting Fu.
As long as the Manchus led the way in reforms all went well, and they have supported it sufficiently to insure its ultimate success in some shape or form. The rising generation of students have been thoroughly bitten with the idea, whilst those who have been trained abroad realize more or less the shortcomings of their country.
In the army, thanks to the energy of Viceroy Yuan or his advisers, the movement was progressing with satisfactory uniformity-satisfactory when one considers the enormous obstacles of ignorance and prejudice that had to be overcome. Unluckily the Court and the Manchu element got jealous of the increasing power of the Viceroy, and this spring four out of his six divisions have been taken away from him and put under the control of Manchus, who are certainly untried and who never appear to have given any proof of capacity.
The uniformity is spoilt and the head-quarter army is now under two heads, instead of being controlled by one master mind. The change is a decided throwback for the army, and from what I can hear there is a general feeling of dissatisfaction among the officers, and two out of the three Divisional Generals affected by the new movement have already resigned. I hope, and believe, that the change is only temporary, and that the new Commanders will get themselves into such a tangle that they will have to return to the old state of affairs.
The Chinese are peaceful and non-aggressive, and I do not believe they will ever (or at any rate for a very long time) have an army like the Japanese. I think, however, that it is very necessary that they should have even a fairly good army, sufficiently strong, so as to prevent their being completely under the domination of some ambitious neighbour, and also strong enough to cope with interual disorder. I believe that if at the present moment a foreign Power were to land 30,000 troops in Chihli the Lu Chun would only offer a feeble resistance, whilst in the outgrowing parts of the Empire the Chinese would not be able to offer any real opposition to invasion.
Judging from last year's manoeuvres the six divisions of Lu Chün in the north are superior in organization and physique to the 8th Division at Wu-ch'ang, and these represent the best troops in China, which are decidedly in advance of the Lu Chün I have seen in other provinces. This, owing to the difficulty of taking the latter out of the management of their respective Viceroys and Governors, who, though in many respects under the control of Peking and always liable to recall, are in many ways like independent Rulers.
In China so much is hidden from the foreigner that it is difficult to know what is working behind the scenes, and one meets the gloomy pessimist, who has lived long in the country and seen its corruption, and who thinks that it never can improve, whilst there is also the cheerful optimist, who is usually a bird of passage, and, seeing only some of the outward shows of reform, thinks that the outlook is most rosy.
It will, however, take a long time before a satisfactory, or partially satisfactory, state of affairs is reached, but it is bound to come at last, and any attempt to hinder the movement would be a short-sighted policy, cause a feeling of distrust, and prolong the present danger of outside rivalries, owing to China's extreme weakness.
Provided there is no unforeseen trouble with foreigners, there ought to be no big upheaval, as long as the Empress-Dowager retains her vitality. If the Manchus had continued to show the way in the reform movement, had given up their old and obsolete privileges, and gradually allowed themselves to be fused in the Chinese race, I think they would have escaped; but now that they have reverted to their old conservative tendencies, I think they are doomed, and that it is only a question of time (it may be long or it may be short) before they are finally driven out of all power. A significant feature is the number of Manchu officials who are being put into high offices.
(Signed) G. E. PEREIRA, Lieutenant-Colonel,
Grenadier Guards, Military Attaché.
This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]
AFFAIRS OF CHINA.
CONFIDENTIAL.
[20055]
No. 1.
391
24463 [June 17.]
SECTION 4. J 07
Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce to Foreign Office.-(Received June 17.)
Sir,
Hong Kong, May 16, 1907. I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch dated the 5th February, on the subject of the compensation to be demanded from the Chinese Government for the loss sustained by the owners of the steam-ship "Sainam" in consequence of the piratical attack made upon that vessel in July of last year while in Chinese waters.
The Committee of this Chamber learn with great regret that His Majesty's Government, after further consideration of the matter, still adhere to their previous decision that no claim should be made on the Chinese Government for the consequential damages asked for by the owners of the steamer.
On behalf of the Committee I would beg to record our most earnest protest against such a decision, a decision which we feel convinced practically amounts to a direct encouragement to the local Chinese officials to pursue their old policy of a more or less covertly hostile attitude towards foreign trade.
Unless full and just reparation be demanded for such an outrage, this Committee considers there is reasonable ground for fearing that further attacks upon British subjects and British vessels may result.
[2524 r-4]
I have, &c. (Signed)
GILBERT S. HILLIER, Chairman.
Hankow, April 21, 1907.
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